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Note 
 
Perception is not Reality: The FCPA, Brazil, and 
the Mismeasurement of Corruption* 
 
Stuart Vincent Campbell** 
 
Just as a fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either 
as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed 
in the government work cannot be found out while taking money for 
themselves. It is possible to mark the movements of birds flying high 
up in the sky; but not so is it possible to ascertain the movement of 
government servants of hidden purpose. – The Art of Politics: 
Kautilya1  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The problem of corruption can be traced back to the far 
reaches of human history,2 and has probably existed as long as 
government itself. Ancient philosophers such as Aristotle and 
Cicero discussed the problem of self–interest in the civil 
service.3 An example of an early attempt by human society to 
regulate corruption through law is a medieval English rule 
promulgated in 1346 which prohibited judges from accepting 
items of value, except for small quantities of meat or drink, in 
order to prevent bribery.4 As much as law has attempted to 
 
      *    The Minnesota Journal of International Law has relied on the author 
for the accuracy of the Portuguese source materials. 
      **  J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. As an 
undergraduate, the author studied abroad at Pontificia Universidade Católica 
in São Paulo, Brazil, and speaks fluent Spanish and Portuguese. The author 
would like to thank his former high school debate coaches Dave McGinnis, 
Rick Brundage, and Arthur Latz–Hall – without whom he would have never 
developed the research skills essential to write this article. 
 1. DONALD MACKENZIE BROWN, THE WHITE UMBRELLA: INDIAN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM MANU TO GANDHI 58 (1964). 
 2. Shang–Jun Wei, Local Corruption and the Global Economy, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH REPORTER, Spring 2000, at 15, available at 
http://nber.org/reporter/spring00/wei.html (comparing the ubiquity of 
corruption in human history to that of cockroaches). 
 3. SEPPO TIIHONEN, THE HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 8–9 (2003). 
 4. Id. 
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stamp out corruption, scholars accept that it persisted on a 
wide scale in the United States until the early 20th Century.5 
In 1977, the United States took the historic step of banning its 
businesspeople from engaging in bribery overseas by passing 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).6 However, 
enforcement was minimal for decades after FCPA passage. This 
was in part due to fear over the possible consequences of 
implementing it7 in a world where many major U.S. trading 
partners still offered tax write–offs for bribes their companies 
gave to foreign officials.8 More recently, international treaties 
have normalized the fight against business corruption.9 The 
past ten years have seen a massive increase in FCPA 
enforcement.10 Indeed, the early 21st Century was the first 
time in human history that international business people had 
been meaningfully threatened with legal sanction in their 
home–countries for promoting their companies’ interests 
overseas through corruption and bribery.  
The United States’ historic effort at regulating such 
corruption could be considered ethically laudable,11 but these 
 
 5. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 
2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 106 (2007) (referring to increased use 
of media as a tool to combat corruption in the United States). In this author’s 
opinion, the case could be made that corruption had a substantial effect on 
United States political history well into the mid and late 20th Century. See, 
e.g., ROBERT CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 
(2002) (documenting Lyndon Johnson’s tenure in the Senate and arguing that 
his ability to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1957 derived substantially from his 
skillful use of illegal campaign contributions, corporate slush funds, and 
intimidation); FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (1995). 
 6. See The International Anti–Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998: 
Hearing on H.R. 4353 Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous 
Materials of the Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) (testimony of Paul 
V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm.), available at 1998 WL 642491 (S.E.C.), for rationale behind the Act.  
 7. Courtney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of 
Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 448–
49 (2010). 
 8. FRANCIS CHERUNILAM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: TEXT AND CASES 
653 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that France and Germany give tax write–offs for 
bribes given to foreign officials to secure business overseas). 
 9. DR. FRÉDÉRIC WEHRLÉ, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO–OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD CORRUPTION: OECD 
COUNTRIES’ EXPERIENCE IN COMBATING BRIBERY AND PROMOTING TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT WORLD–WIDE 2–3 (2005), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/34448578.pdf. 
 10. Thomas, supra note 7, at 449–50. 
 11. The United States has been called a “Boy Scout” for its ethically high–
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fledgling attempts have implicated the same issue identified by 
Kautiliya in 4th Century B.C. India: The difficulty, or indeed 
impossibility, of detecting and accurately measuring 
corruption.12 Researchers, most notably those working for the 
anti–corruption non–profit Transparency International, have 
attempted to measure corruption by using the perception of 
corruption as a proxy for its actual occurrence.13 Though 
corruption perception is the most widely used and popular 
means of measuring corruption,14 critics like Brazilian 
corruption researcher Claudio Weber Abramo have questioned 
the construct validity of measuring a country’s level of 
corruption by measuring the level of perceived corruption 
attributed to it — arguing  that the perception proxy “has more 
than run its course.”15 This paper argues that the legal 
profession’s reliance on a flawed indicator of corruption 
implicates a literature critical of the economic effects of the 
FCPA and aims to strengthen the position taken by academics 
who favor the addition of a “compliance defense” to the FCPA.16 
Though the problems discussed in this note are pervasive in 
present efforts to regulate international corruption, this note is 
built on the illustrative example of Brazil, which, unlike 
similarly situated countries such as China,17 India,18 and 
 
minded attempt to prevent overseas bribery because of the potentially 
crippling effects this could have on American businesses. See, e.g., Patrick 
Glynn et al., Inst. for Int’l Econ., The Globalization of Corruption, in 
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 17 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 
1997). 
 12. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 58. 
 13. For discussion of this issue, see infra Part III. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Murk Meter: The best–known corruption index may have run its 
course, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 30th–Nov. 5th 2010, at 66, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/17363752. 
 16. See infra Part II.2, for a discussion of the corporate compliance 
defense in the U.K. Bribery Act. 
 17. See Bruce M. Boyd, Governmental Corruption in China: Application of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 235, 235 (2004) 
(“[Chinese corruption] is especially problematic for companies from the United 
States which are prohibited from bribing governmental officials to obtain or 
retain business by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘FCPA’).”); Nicole Y. 
Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be Found By 
U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Violations, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 19, 22 (2007) (“Certain 
aspects of Chinese culture, especially quanxi . . . and mianzi . . . pose a high 
degree of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act . . . .”); Hilary K. 
Josephs, The Uprights and the Low–Down: An Examination of Official 
Corruption in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 27 
CAMPBELL - FCPA in Brazil (22 MINN J INTL L 247 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:52 PM 
250 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW   [Vol 22:1 
 
Russia,19 has not been the subject of FCPA compliance research 
published by law journals.20 The example of Brazil is 
 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 269, 298 (2000) (describing the different cultural 
understandings of what is violative gift–giving under Chinese law and the 
FCPA); Mike Koehler, The Unique FCPA Compliance Challenges of Doing 
Business in China, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 397, 397–98 (2007) (examining the 
intricacies of FCPA compliance for American businesses seeking to do 
business in China); Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear, Unique Problems with 
FCPA Compliance in the People’s Republic of China,  BUS. L. TODAY 15, 
May/June 2007, at 15 (“Common sense, therefore, dictates that PRC business 
plans incorporate controls to ensure that the U.S. companies and issuers and 
third parties working on their behalf be in compliance with the FCPA from the 
outset . . . .”); Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its 
Application to U.S. Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13, 14 
(2008) (“Given the fact that corruption in China is widespread, and the 
government still owns and manages the country’s largest companies, 
compliance with the [FCPA] can be exceptionally challenging for U.S. 
corporations that conduct business operations in China.”); F. Joseph Warin et. 
al., FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 33, 35 (2010) (addressing the legal risks of Chinese gift and 
hospitality culture and presenting suggestions for structuring compliance 
programs); Delia Poon, Note, Exposure to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A 
Guide for U.S. Companies With Activities in the People’s Republic of China to 
Minimize Liability, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 345 (1996) 
(proffering FCPA compliance measures for U.S. businesses in their dealings 
with China). 
 18. See Beverly Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti–Corruption Efforts Paying 
Off? International and National Measures in the Asia–Pacific Region and their 
Impact on India and Multinational Corporations, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 59, 78–
84 (2008) (reviewing effects of the Asian Development Bank on business in 
India); Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 389, 389 (1998) (“India’s current anti–corruption laws are 
ineffective; hence, U.S. corporations find it increasingly difficult to follow the 
requirements of the [FCPA] while doing business in India, ‘one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world.’”). 
 19. See Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia: 
Implications for U.S. and International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1999, 
1999 (1996) (warning U.S. businesses of the risks under both Russian and 
United States law of bribing Russian government officials, and warning the 
U.S. Government that such bribery undermines the transformation to 
democracy in Russia); Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA 
in Russia and other Former Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 378, 378 
(1997) (noting the challenge of competing effectively in Russia and complying 
with the FCPA); William Spiegelberger, Russian Roulette: Doing Business in 
Russia in Compliance with Anti–Bribery Laws and Treaties, 2 N.Y.U. J. L & 
BUS. 819, 821 (2006) (“[C]ombination of a treacherous business environment 
and often murky ownership structures presents a considerable problem for 
foreign companies that want to do business in Russia in compliance with their 
domestic legislation criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials.”). 
 20. The most detailed existing research of FCPA compliance in Brazil 
treats Latin America generally and contains only two textual references to 
Brazil, thus doing little more than listing it as a country in the region. See 
Veronica Foley & Catina Haynes, The FCPA and its Impact in Latin America, 
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particularly useful for demonstrating the weakness of 
statistical measures of corruption because “Brazil is not easily 
grasped by the eagle’s eye”;21 that is, Brazil is particularly 
difficult to comprehend through use of the grand 
generalizations that underlie the most popular statistical 
measures for corruption.   
Critics of the economic effects of the FCPA have argued 
that the law functions as a sanction on developing countries, 
because it creates disincentives to invest in economies that are 
perceived to carry high corruption risk — most frequently 
developing countries in need of development capital.22 The 
thesis of this note is that lawyers’ reliance on the highly flawed 
proxy of corruption perception may contribute to the economic 
distortion created by the FCPA — deterring investment in 
important developing economies such as Brazil. Part II briefly 
examines the most important legislation regulating American 
businesspeople in Brazil. Part III compares different types of 
statistics purporting to measure corruption in Brazil, 
demonstrating the wide divide between different corruption 
measures. Part IV investigates the corruption perception 
statistics commonly used by the legal community to measure 
FCPA compliance risk, and whether the FCPA deters American 
businesses from investing in developing economies. This section 
of the note also argues that criticisms of corruption perception 
statistics strengthen a broader literature, and argues for a 
compliance defense in the FCPA. Part V concludes.  
 
II. BACKGROUND ON ANTI–CORRUPTION 
LEGISLATION RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS IN BRAZIL 
There are three sets of laws likely to be relevant to 
American businesses investing in Brazil: those of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Brazil itself. The FCPA and 
the Travel Act have both been used by the United States to 
punish international bribery.23 The United Kingdom’s 2010 
 
17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 27, 27 & 40 (2009). 
 21. Cláudio Weber Abramo, Introduction to TRANSPARÊNCIA BRASIL, 
REPORT ON BRAZIL: PRESENTED TO THE GLOBAL FORUM II ON FIGHTING 
CORRUPTION (2001), available at 
http://www.transparencia.org.br/docs/GFIIReport.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g., Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: 
Understanding Anti–Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against 
Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010). 
 23. See infra notes 34, 52 and 62 and accompanying text. 
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Bribery Act is also relevant to many American businesses 
because of its far–reaching jurisdictional provisions.24 Finally, 
American businesses need to consider Brazilian law — both 
because host country law influences the application of the 
FCPA,25 and also because it has been used to prosecute 
international businesspeople who have attempted to bribe 
Brazilian officials.26   
 
1. U.S. LAWS REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
CORRUPTION 
In 2009, a man who represented himself as an agent of the 
Minister of Defense of Gabon approached sales representatives 
for various weapons manufacturers to offer them the 
opportunity to outfit his country’s elite presidential guard.27 In 
order for the transaction to go forward, he asked for a 20% 
commission that he claimed was legal.28 In reality, the man’s 
purported business proposal was concocted by the FBI to 
ensnare American business executives in an FCPA 
investigation.29 This aggressive and proactive enforcement 
exemplifies the unprecedented vigor that characterizes current 
United States anti–corruption investigation. Most international 
anti–corruption prosecutions pursued by the United States are 
brought under the FCPA, which only bans public sector 
bribery. However, American businesses also need to consider 
the Travel Act, which has been interpreted to allow 
prosecutions for private sector bribery as well.30   
 
 24. See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra note 47 (using Germany’s aggressive enforcement in 
corruption matters as example of need to coordinate with other nations to 
account for their interests and sovereignty). 
 26. See, e.g., Hariri Probe Seeks Lebanese Banker Arrested for Bribery in 
Brazil, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187765,00.html (discussing a case where 
a bank executive was arrested for attempting to give Brazilian police a 
$200,000 bribe). 
 27. Jeremy Pelofsky, Mistrial in U.S. Bribery Sting After Jury Deadlock, 
REUTERS, Jul. 7, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-bribery-
verdict-idUSTRE7667R320110707. 
 28. Christopher Norton, Gabon FCPA Informant Says He Claimed Deal 
Was Legal, LAW360 (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/283302. 
 29. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
TWENTY–TWO EXECUTIVES AND EMPLOYEES OF MILITARY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PRODUCTS COMPANIES CHARGED IN FOREIGN BRIBERY SCHEME 
(Jan. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm-
048.html [hereinafter TWENTY–TWO EXECUTIVES]. 
 30. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
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The FCPA was passed in 1977 as a reaction to public 
outrage prompted by high profile cases of corporate 
corruption31 and amended three times thereafter in 1988, 1994, 
and 1998.32 The FCPA contains provisions that prohibit foreign 
bribery, which are enforced by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), as well as requirements that companies engage in 
accounting practices to deter corruption, which are enforced by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).33 Violations of 
both the FCPA accounting34 and bribery35 provisions can lead 
to heavy fines for business–violators, and bribery violations by 
individuals can lead to time in prison.36  
FCPA bribery provisions make it a crime to: 
(1) “willfully”; (2) “make use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce,” (3) “corruptly;” (4) “in furtherance of 
an offer, payment, promise to pay, or 
authorization of the payment of any more, or 
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of 
the giving of anything of value to;” (5) “any 
foreign official;” (6) “for purposes of [either] 
influencing any act or decision of such foreign 
official in his official capacity [or] inducing such 
foreign official to do or omit to do any act in 
violation of the lawful duty of such official [or] 
securing any improper advantage,” (7) “in order 
to assist such [corporation] in obtaining or 
retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to, any person.”37  
The FCPA’s accounting provisions require companies that 
issue securities to “make and keep books, records, and 
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly 
 
 31. S. REP. NO. 95–114, at 3 (1977); H.R. REP. NO. 95–640, at 5–6 (1977). 
 32. The content of these amendments falls outside the scope of this 
research, which focuses on the present–day compliance challenges faced by 
American companies. 
 33. Thomas, supra note 7, at 439–44. 
 34. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (2002) 
(originally enacted as Act of 1977); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (2012) (originally 
enacted as Act of 1977). 
 35. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–2 (1998); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–3(e) (1998); 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78ff(c) (2002). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. §§78dd–2(g)(2)(A) (2000). 
 37. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 15 
U.S.C §§78dd–2, 78ff (2000)). 
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reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
[i]ssuer.”38 The accounting provisions not only make it more 
difficult for companies to hide corrupt payments, but also mean 
that when the DOJ files a criminal complaint for violations of 
the anti–bribery provisions, the SEC can begin a parallel civil 
action, as businesses generally attempt to label bribes 
misleadingly in their books and records.39  
The wide jurisdictional provisions of the FCPA make it an 
important consideration for a variety of companies whose 
operations are connected to the United States. The FCPA 
applies to real persons, businesses organized under the laws of 
the United States, foreign companies that issue U.S. 
securities,40 and to any officer director, employee, or agent of 
any such company.41 The FCPA’s jurisdiction can even reach 
foreign businesses or individuals that merely have bank 
accounts in the United States, or that discuss improper 
payments at a meeting in the United States.42 These provisions 
subject many international companies to FCPA jurisdiction by 
way of their connections with the United States.  
The last few years have seen an unprecedented increase in 
enforcement of the FCPA, which, for many years of its 
existence, was not frequently or proactively enforced.43 The 
aggressive enforcement environment traces back to 2007, when 
the number of DOJ enforcement actions jumped up to nineteen 
from the previous year’s seven enforcement actions.44 In fiscal 
year 2010, the DOJ imposed one billion dollars in FCPA 
penalties — the largest in the FCPA’s history.45 The DOJ has 
 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2000); Koehler, supra note 17, at 411–
12. 
 40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–1(a)(1) (1998). 
 41. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–1(a) (1998). 
 42. Obiamaka P. Madubuko, Emerging Markets: Risky Business or Golden 
Opportunities?, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT COMPLIANCE ISSUES 79, 
available at 2010 WL 2828304 (July 2010). 
 43. Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police: What’s Behind the 
New Boom in FCPA Enforcement Activity?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, May 
2010, at 14, 15 (“Enforcement actions were rare until about four years ago, but 
the numbers have exploded since then: 40 cases filed last year, compared to 12 
in 2005. . . .”). 
 44. FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions Chronological List 2007, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE FRAUD DIVISION, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2007.html (last visited Oct. 2, 
2012). 
 45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 11–085, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECURED MORE THAN $2 BILLION IN JUDGMENTS 
CAMPBELL - FCPA in Brazil (22 MINN J INTL L 247 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:52 PM 
2013] FCPA IN BRAZIL 255 
 
also substantially increased aggressive enforcement tactics that 
were rarely used in the past, including criminal prosecutions 
against individual executives.46 The DOJ shows no signs of 
relenting, with FCPA enforcement continuing to be a top 
agency priority.47  
One notable feature of the FCPA relevant to the following 
analysis is the absence of widely available affirmative defenses. 
The FCPA has no affirmative corporate “compliance” defense, 
like that found in the British Bribery Act discussed below, for 
corporations that have strong programs intended to prevent 
bribery.48 The two affirmative defenses and “exception” that the 
FCPA does contain are rarely used — leading critics to call 
them “meaningless for FCPA defendants,”49 and “useless,”50 a 
criticism that even defenders of the FCPA essentially concede.51  
The first FCPA affirmative defense says that otherwise 
prohibited payments are not illegal if the transfer was “lawful 
under the written laws and regulations of the 
foreign . . . country.”52 This defense does little to help 
defendants.53 Even countries where corruption is an accepted 
and normal practice do not explicitly condone it in written 
laws.54 The second FCPA affirmative defense says no violation 
 
AND SETTLEMENTS AS A RESULT OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS LEAD BY THE 
CRIMINAL DIVISION (Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-crm-085.html. 
 46. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Assistant, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/44435824/Prepared-Statement-of-Greg-Andres-
DOJ-Senate-Hearing-Examining-Enforcement-of-the-FCPA-Nov-30-2010. 
 47. Bruce Carton, The Summer of FCPA, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jun. 14, 
2011, http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?returl=/the-summer-
of-fcpa/article/204856/. 
 48. Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative 
Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global 
Enforcement, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 399–400 (2011). 
 49. Kyle P. Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative 
Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464, 464 
(2010). 
 50. Id. at 466 
 51. Thomas, supra note 7, at 447 (“This second affirmative defense has 
been increasingly invoked by defendants, though not necessarily with any 
measure of success. Defendants do not seem to invoke the ‘lawful under the 
laws’ defense commonly.”). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1(c)(1), –2(c)(1), –3(c)(1) (1998). 
 53. Sheahen, supra note 49, at 472–74. 
 54. Id. at 470. 
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occurs when a payment is made for a “reasonable” and “bona 
fide expenditure” that was directly related to the “promotion, 
demonstration, or explanation of products or services or the 
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign 
government or agency thereof.”55 While some defendants do try 
to invoke this defense, the DOJ has a very strong track record 
arguing against such claims.56 Finally, the FCPA does not 
apply to “facilitation payments” made to speed up routine 
governmental action,57 but this exception has been read very 
narrowly by courts. In effect, it does not even apply to the 
majority of international business transactions that implicate 
the FCPA.58 
Another notable feature of the FCPA, which is especially 
interesting in light of the following analysis of the Bribery Act, 
is that the FCPA only prohibits the bribery of public–sector 
recipients. Another U.S. law, the Travel Act, broadly prohibits 
the use of “interstate or foreign commerce or any facility in 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent to . . . promote, 
manage, establish, carry on or facilitate the promotion, 
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful 
activity”59 found on a list of state–law crimes that includes 
bribery.60 Though the Travel Act was originally intended as a 
tool to fight organized crime in the United States, the DOJ has 
begun to use it to supplement FCPA prosecutions and has 
argued that the Travel Act can be used as a stand–alone tool to 
prosecute companies for private–sector bribery, even in cases 
not covered by the FCPA.61 Therefore, even though the FCPA 
does not technically prohibit bribery of foreign businesspeople, 
the American scheme of anti–corruption legislation does ban 
such activities.  
 
 55. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 100–418, § 5003(a), 
102 Stat. 1107 (amended 1988) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§78dd–1(c)(2), –2(c)(2), 
–3(c)(2) (2000)). 
 56. Sheahen, supra note 49, at 484–86.  
 57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1(b), –2(b), –3(b) (1998). 
 58. Harry L. Clark & Jonathan W. Ware, Limits on International 
Business in the Petroleum Sector: CFIUS Investment Screening, Economic 
Sanctions, Anti–Bribery, and Other Measures, 6 TEX. J. OIL & ENERGY L. 75, 
112 (2010–2011). 
 59. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (2002). 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2006). 
 61. John Hillebrecht & Kiera Gans, FCPA Defense Complicated by Travel 
Act, CORPORATE SECRETARY (Oct. 20, 2010), 
http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/fcpa/11389/fcpa-defense-
complicated-travel-act/. 
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2. THE U.K. BRIBERY ACT OF 2010 
In July 2011 the Bribery Act 2010 came into effect, 
repealing all of the United Kingdom’s previous statutory and 
common law provisions related to bribery,62 and replacing them 
with a new broad scheme which, unlike the FCPA, applies to 
both the private and public sectors.63 Though the Bribery Act 
has been called the “toughest anti–corruption legislation in the 
world,”64 it does contain an affirmative defense for compliance. 
Like the FCPA, the Bribery Act applies worldwide, and its 
jurisdictional provisions are broadly drafted so that any 
business with ties to the United Kingdom must consider its 
prohibitions when designing its anti–corruption legal 
compliance program.65 The Bribery Act bans bribing, being 
bribed, bribery of foreign public officials, and failure of 
commercial organizations to prevent bribery.66 Individuals 
convicted under the Bribery Act can face an uncapped fine as 
well as up to ten years in prison, and organizations convicted of 
failure to prevent bribery face an uncapped fine.67 
The broad jurisdictional scope of some offenses in the 
Bribery Act makes it an important part of the regulatory 
scheme that American businesses should consider when 
formulating an anti–corruption compliance program. For 
American companies, the most relevant offense is the “failure of 
commercial organizations to prevent bribery,” which can be 
prosecuted “irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which 
form part of the offense take place in the United Kingdom or 
 
 62. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 17 (U.K.), available at  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/17; see also THE CROWN 
PROSECUTION SERVICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: JOINT PROSECUTION GUIDANCE OF 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC 
PROSECUTIONS (Mar. 30, 2011),  available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/bribery_act_2010/#a01 (prior regulation of 
bribery in the U.K. included the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889 
and the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906) [hereinafter JOINT 
PROSECUTION]. 
 63. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 3 (U.K.), available at 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents. 
 64. Curtis C. Verschoor, U.K. Bribery Act Offers Best Practices for 
Preventing Corruption, BUSINESS FINANCE (Sept. 9, 2011), 
http://businessfinancemag.com/article/uk-bribery-act-offers-best-practices-
preventing-corruption-0909. 
 65. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text; JOINT PROSECUTION, 
supra note 62, § 3.   
 66. JOINT PROSECUTION, supra note 62, § 3. 
 67. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 11 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.  
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elsewhere.”68 The Act applies these provisions to organizations 
incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, 
or any foreign company that “carries on a business, or part of a 
business, in any part of the United Kingdom.”69 The Bribery 
Act does not define the vague “carries on a business” language 
and British Ministry of Justice (MOJ) commentary has not 
explained exactly what activities would subject a company to 
the Bribery Act’s strictures.70 As a result of the jurisdictional 
reach of the Bribery Act, a great number of American 
companies with British operations need to revise their FCPA 
compliance programs to account for the Bribery Act’s 
provisions.71  
American companies might also fall within the Bribery 
Act’s jurisdictional scope of the offenses of bribery, accepting a 
bribe, and bribing of foreign public officials even though the 
Bribery Act only grants jurisdiction for these crimes when a 
portion of the offense takes place in the United Kingdom or 
portions of the offense are committed by individuals with a 
“close connection” to the United Kingdom such as citizens, 
residents, and businesses organized under British law.72 
Therefore, even some companies with no British operations 
may be subject to the Bribery Act’s wide jurisdictional reach.  
Importantly, the Bribery Act criminalizes the failure of 
commercial organizations to prevent bribery.73 The Bribery Act 
 
 68. Id. §§ 7(7), 12(6). 
 69. Id. § 7(5)(b). 
 70. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: CIRCULAR 2011/05 para. 22 
(June 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/circulars/bribery-act-2010-
circular-2011-5.pdf (explaining that the phrase “carries on a business” should 
be interpreted with a “common sense approach”).  
 71. The MOJ has not clarified exactly what British business presence will 
leave a company subject to the Bribery Act, but they have said that having 
stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange or owning a British subsidiary 
will not make a company subject to the act. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE 
BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE ABOUT PROCEDURES WHICH RELEVANT 
COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN PUT INTO PLACE TO PREVENT PERSONS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THEM FROM BRIBING para. 36 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/making-reviewing-law/bribery-
act-2010-guidance.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE]. 
 72. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: CIRCULAR 2011/05 para. 9 
(June 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/circulars/bribery-act-2010-
circular-2011-5.pdf.  
 73. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(1) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents (“A relevant commercial 
organisation [sic] (“C”) is guilty of an offence [sic] under this section if a person 
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states that a business is guilty of an offence if a person 
“associated with” a business bribes another person intending to 
“obtain or retain business” for the company or to “obtain or 
retain an advantage in the conduct of business.”74 The statute 
states that a person is culpable only if their actions would make 
them guilty of the offense of bribery or bribery of a foreign 
official.75 The Ministry has stated that a person or entity is 
“associated” with a commercial organization if they “perform 
services” for or on behalf of the organization, including 
employees, agents, and subsidiaries are included.76  Even 
contractors or suppliers can be considered “associated” when 
they perform services on behalf of an organization.77 
According to the Bribery Act, a person is guilty of bribing 
another person if they “promise or give a financial or other 
advantage to another person” with the intention to “induce a 
person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity,” or 
to reward them for the improper performance of such a function 
or activity,78 in either the public or the private sector.79 A 
person is also guilty of bribing if they give or promise an 
advantage to another person, knowing that accepting the 
advantage “would itself constitute improper performance of a 
relevant function or activity.”80 Similarly, a person is guilty of 
accepting a bribe under Section 2 if they request, agree to 
receive, or accept a “financial or other advantage”81 when it is 
intended that any improper performance follow as a 
consequence of the request, when the acceptance of such an 
advantage is itself improper, or when the advantage is given as 
a reward for improper performance.82 The MOJ has said that 
this potentially broad language will not be used to pursue 
 
(“A”) associated with C bribes another person intending– (a) to obtain or retain 
business for C, or (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of 
business for C.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See infra notes 78–87, and accompanying text for discussion of the 
elements of these crimes.   
 76. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 37. 
 77. Id. at para. 38. 
 78. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1(2) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents. 
 79. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 18. 
 80. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1(3) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.  
 81. Id. § 2(1–8). 
 82. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, Explanatory Notes, § 2, para. 22 (U.K.), 
available at www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/notes/division/5/2. 
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prosecutions against individuals who give items of value as a 
part of a legitimate “public relations exercise designed to 
cement good relations.”83 The Bribery Act has a separate 
section prohibiting the giving of bribes to a “foreign public 
official,” defined as someone who “holds a legislative, 
administrative or judicial position of any kind,” or who 
exercises a public function for a public agency or public 
enterprise in that country.84 Under Section 6, a person is 
considered to have bribed if they offer, promise, or give any 
financial or other advantage either directly or indirectly85 with 
the intention to obtain or retain some sort of business 
advantage,86  Unlike the offenses of bribery and accepting a 
bribe, no showing of an intended “improper performance” is 
required to show bribery of a public official – meaning that, like 
the FCPA, the Bribery Act requires businesses to be especially 
careful when dealing with foreign government agents.87  
For the purpose of this paper, the most notable part of the 
Bribery Act is the inclusion of a “compliance defense.” The 
Bribery Act includes several different affirmative defenses. 
Most fall outside the scope of this paper because they are not 
likely to be consistently relevant to American businesses.88 
However, the Bribery Act’s provision for a “compliance defense” 
economically states: “it is a defense for [a corporation] to prove 
that [the corporation] had in place adequate procedures 
designed to prevent persons associated with [the corporation] 
from undertaking such conduct.”89 Though the Bribery Act 
itself does nothing to define “adequate,” it does require the 
MOJ to release a compliance guideline.90 Current MOJ 
 
 83. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 20. 
 84. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6(5) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents. 
 85. Id. § 6(3). 
 87. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 23. 
 87. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 23. 
 88. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 13 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents (establishing an 
affirmative defense for bribery conducted in the course of espionage); 
GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 48 (indicating the MOJ intends to recognize 
the defense of duress). 
 89. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents. 
 90. Section 9 requires the Secretary of State, who heads the Ministry of 
Justice, to publish guidance about procedures that commercial organizations 
can use to prevent their employees from bribing, and may revise these 
procedures “from time to time.” Id. § 9.   
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guidance calls for a program based on six principles: 
compliance programs designed to account for the size and 
nature of the bribery risk,91 “top–level commitment” within the 
company to eliminating bribery,92 periodic documentation of 
risk–assessments,93  due diligence research on all associated 
persons businesses,94 internal and external communication and 
training regarding the organization’s anti–corruption policy,95 
and monitoring and reviews based on observed problems to 
make changes based on any problems encountered.96 
 
3. BRAZILIAN ANTI–CORRUPTION LAW  
Brazil is a signatory to various international anti–
corruption agreements including the Organization for Economic 
Co–operation and Development Anti–Bribery Convention, 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the 
Organization of American States Inter–American Convention 
Against Corruption.97 Brazil has strong anti–corruption laws 
which prohibit a wide variety of corrupt acts.98 Though Brazil is 
still grappling with serious corruption problems, this recent 
legislation has substantially strengthened the fight against 
corruption in politics.  
Brazil has a substantial historical problem with political 
corruption, which was accepted by Brazilians for much of the 
20th Century.99 Indeed, supporters of Adhemar de Barros, 
governor of São Paulo state during the 1960s, defended him 
from accusations of corruption by proclaiming, “He steals, but 
he makes things happen,” a saying that became an unofficial 
 
 91. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at paras. 1.1–1.7. 
 92. Id. at paras. 2.1–2.4. 
 93. Id. at paras. 3.1–3.6. 
 94. Id. at paras. 4.1–4.6. 
 95. Id. at paras. 5.1–5.8. 
 96. Id. at paras. 6.1–6.4. 
 97. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, UNCAC SIGNATURE 
AND RATIFICATION AS OF 12 JULY 2012 (2012), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html; JOINT 
VENTURES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 117 (Darrell Prescott & Salli A. 
Swartz eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 98. Decreto No. 2.848, de 1940, arts. 332, 333, 337-B, 337-C, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de 31.12.1940 (Braz.); Decreto No. 9.613, de 1998, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de 4.3.1998 (Braz.). 
 99. CLÁUDIO WEBER & BRUNO WILHEM SPECK, NATIONAL INTEGRITY 
SYSTEMS, COUNTRY STUDY REPORT: BRAZIL 2001 17 (2001), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/nis_reports_by_country. 
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campaign slogan for de Barros.100 However, Brazil has recently 
passed numerous laws that address the issue of political 
corruption, including a freedom of information act that requires 
disclosure of public spending, and a law that bans politicians 
with criminal records from running for office.101 These laws 
enjoy widespread public support among voters who oppose 
government corruption.102 Furthermore, Projecto de Lei 
6826/2010, a bill proposed by the executive in 2010, 103 would 
create corporate liability for companies whose agents bribe on a 
company’s behalf.104  
In keeping with its international treaty obligations to fight 
corruption, Brazil has passed laws that prohibit various corrupt 
acts. As previously noted, it is important for American 
businesspeople to know that civil servants in Brazil are 
prohibited from participating in “passive corruption” by 
soliciting or accepting any “undue advantage.”105  Brazilian law 
also bans “active corruption,” the giving or promising of an 
“undue advantage” to a public servant to cause them to make, 
omit, or delay any official act.106 Brazil, like the United States, 
bans bribes to foreign public officials.107 There are also 
prohibitions on various practices connected with bribery 
including the “traffic of influence” both within Brazil,108 and in 
the context of international business transactions.109 Other 
 
 100. Id. at 27 n.40. 
 101. Stuart Grudgings, Analysis: Brazil’s Rousseff Rides Anti–Graft Wave, 
For Now, REUTERS, Nov. 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/07/us-brazil-corruption-
idUSTRE7A63G420111107. 
 102. Id. (noting that an anti–corruption bill passed after 1.5 million 
Brazilians signed a petition in support). 
 103. Câmara dos Deputados do Brasil, Projetos de Leis e Outras Proposições 
PL 6826/2010, (18/12/2010), available at 
http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=46
6400. 
 104. As of the date of publication the proposal appears as though it may be 
stalled in a special committee of the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados. Agência 
Câmara de Notícias, Cancelada votação do parecer sobre projeto da Lei 
Anticorrupção, (13/06/2012), available at 
http://www2.camara.gov.br/agencia/noticias/POLITICA/419795-CANCELADA-
VOTACAO-DO-PARECER-SOBRE-PROJETO-DA-LEI-
ANTICORRUPCAO.html. 
 105. Decreto No. 2.848, de 1940, art. 317, DIÁRO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de 
31.12.1940 (Braz.). 
 106. Id. at art. 333.  
 107. Id. at arts. 337–B, –C. 
 108. Id. at art. 332. 
 109. Id. at art. 337–C. 
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laws prohibit laundering money gained through political 
corruption, and make it illegal to otherwise conceal or disguise 
the true nature, origin, location, disposition, movement, or 
ownership of assets.110 Although Brazil has had problem 
implementing these laws,111 it does have a framework in place 
through which to prohibit bribery and has even prosecuted 
several domestic politicians.112 The problem is one of 
implementation, rather than legislation.113   
 
III. DATA ON CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL 
Quality measures of corruption are important for American 
lawyers because companies should consider country risks when 
formulating their FCPA compliance programs.114 The British 
MOJ guidance even explicitly instructs businesses subject to 
the Bribery Act to consider “country risk” in formulating a 
proportionate compliance program.115 Furthermore, there are 
transnational legal NGOs devoted to documenting and 
comparing corruption between nations and suggesting policy 
changes.116 Lawyers, businesses, and legal NGOs all need 
accurate data on corruption or their work may be less effective 
 
 110. Decreto No. 9.613, de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de 4.3.1998 
(Braz.). 
 111. Although Brazil is one of 38 countries that has ratified the OECD 
Antibribery Convention, it has been accused of not doing enough to enforce its 
anti–bribery laws. See Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Progress Report 2010: 
Enforcement of the OECD Anti–Bribery Convention, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL (2010), available at 
http://archive.transparency.org/publications/publications/conventions/oecd_rep
ort_2010. 
 112. Brazil recently convicted two politicians of corruption charges, though 
there are many more that merit prosecution – a problem that the article 
suggests will be partially addressed by recent legal changes. Cleaning Up: A 
Campaign Against Corruption, ECONOMIST, July 10, 2010, at 36, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16542611. 
 113. Roger M. Witten et. al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti–
Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. 
LAW. 691, 691 (2009). 
 114. Roger M. Witten et. al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti–
Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. 
LAW. 691, 691 (2009). 
 115. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 25, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/making-reviewing-law/bribery-
act-2010-guidance.pdf. 
 116. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
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or even counterproductive. This need for accurate information 
is problematic because those engaged in corruption endeavor to 
conceal their activities. Researchers attempting to generate 
cross–country comparisons of corruption have struggled with 
the impossibility of  directly measuring the activity117 and have 
been forced to rely on various proxies for calculating the actual 
occurrence of corruption.118 The most popular way to measure 
corruption has been to measure perceptions of corruption.119 
Data on Brazil indicates that it is perceived to be quite 
corrupt,120 but other corruption proxies give researchers reason 
to suspect that in the case of Brazil, perception may not 
correspond with reality in any substantial way.121 
 
1. PERCEIVED CORRUPTION DATA FOR BRAZIL 
The most popular measures of corruption are 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 
PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide, and the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators Database.122 All these studies 
share a common methodology — the use of opinion data to 
compare corruption between nations. All of these measures 
indicate that Brazil is perceived to be a country with very 
corrupt public institutions,123 which is to be expected since the 
three measures correlate strongly with each–other.124  
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index aggregates third–party polls on public perceptions of the 
levels of corruption in different countries.125 According to the 
 
 117. Jakob Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, 19 J.  ECON. 
PERSP. 19, 19–21 (2005). 
 118. More recent measures have tried to indirectly measure corruption by 
measuring its opposite: the strength of a nation’s institutions to prevent 
corruption. See Dilyan Donchev & Gergely Ujhelyi, Do Corruption Indices 
Measure Corruption? 4 (Mar. 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.cj- 
resources.com/CJ_Corrections_pdfs/Do%20Corruption%20Indices%20Measure
%20Corruption%20-%20Dilyan%20et%20al%202007.pdf; Daniel Kaufmann, et 
al., Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities, DEV. OUTREACH (Dec. 2006), 
www.devoutreach.com. 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. See infra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Daniel Treisman, What Have We Learned About the Causes of 
Corruption from Ten Years of Cross–National Empirical Research?, 10 ANNU. 
REV. POL. SCI. 211, 219 (2007). 
 122. Donchev, supra note 118, at 4. 
 123. See infra notes 124, 129, 133 and accompanying text. 
 124. Treisman, supra note 121, at 213.  
 125. Transparency Int’l, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, 4 (2010), 
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2010 Global Corruption Report, Brazil has a “serious corruption 
problem.”126 It ranked sixty–ninth highest on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index among the 178 countries covered by the 
report.127 Transparency International has also released a Bribe 
Payers Index (BPI), which asks businesspeople about their 
perception of the likelihood that foreign firms from various 
countries will offer bribes.128 The 2008 BPI ranked Brazil a 7.7 
on a scale of zero to ten with higher scores indicating lower 
likelihood of offering bribes abroad.129 This deceptively high 
score actually places Brazil in the second most corrupt cluster 
of countries discussed in the report.130  
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), compiled by 
the private research company PRS Group, includes numerical 
rankings based on various political, financial, and economic 
risks as perceived by the group’s experts.131 One factor in the 
ICRG’s assessment of political risk is an assessment of 
corruption on a six–point scale with higher scores indicating a 
lower risk of corruption.132 This score includes the risk of 
demands for special payments or bribes for licenses, tax 
assessments and police protection, but focuses on “patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor–for–favors’, secret party 
funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and 
business.”133 ICRG data for January 2011 rates Brazil’s 
corruption risk at three out of a possible six points,134 
indicating that Brazil is perceived to have a serious problem 
 
available at 
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/132/531/2010_CPI_EN.pdf. 
 126. Countries are scored from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (very clean) 
with scores below five considered to indicate a “serious corruption problem.” 
Transparency Int’l, Annual Report 2010, 78 (Alice Harrison & Michael Sidwell 
eds., 2010).   
 127. Id. 
 128. Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, Bribe 
Payers Index 2011, 2 (2011), available at 
http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/results/. 
 129. Id. at 5. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See ICRG Methodology, International Country Risk Guide, PRS GRP., 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 132. ICRG Methodology, The Political Risk Rating, PRS GRP., 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012)  
[hereinafter Political Risk Rating]. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Table 3B: Political Risk Points by Component – Janurary 2011, PRS 
GRP., http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/sT3B.xls (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).   
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with corruption in its public institutions.135  
The World Bank’s Governance Indicators Database 
aggregates various organizational, individual, and expert 
survey responses to assign a numerical value to the quality of 
countries’ governance.136 One of the governance quality 
indicators tracked by the World Bank is control of corruption 
which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests.”137 Scores for corruption range from 
approximately—2.5 for weak anti–corruption measures to 2.5 
for strong government performance against corruption.138 The 
2010 Governance Indicators Database gives Brazil a score of 
0.056112, which puts Brazil in the fifty–ninth percentile for its 
perceptions of effectiveness of anti–corruption measures.139  
 
2. NON–PERCEPTION–BASED INDICATORS OF CORRUPTION IN 
BRAZIL  
Some researchers have sought to develop alternate 
measures for corruption out of concerns that perception may 
not be a good proxy for reality.140 One alternative is to study 
experiences with corruption, instead of perceptions of 
corruption.141 Studies using this approach have found little 
correlation between a country’s corruption perception score and 
the experience of corruption,142 instead finding the relationship 
between perception and experience to be random.143 Studies 
 
 135. Political Risk Rating, supra note 132 (noting that getting a score 
around half of the total points indicates “very high risk”). 
 136. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, World Bank, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See Treisman, supra note 121, at 211–14; see also Svensson, supra 
note 116, at 207–30; see generally Naci Mocan, Corruption, Corruption 
Perception, and Economic Growth, in ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: INSTITUTIONS, CORRUPTION, AND REFORM 
38, 38 (Serdar Sayan ed., 2009) (creating aggregate–country level–corruption 
index from survey micro data set over 90,000 individuals in 49 countries). 
 141. Donchev, supra note 118, at 8–10. 
 142. See Treisman, supra note 121, at 214–17. 
 143. Claudio Weber Abramo, How Much Do Perceptions of Corruption 
Really Tell Us?, 2 ECON.: OPEN–ACCESS, OPEN–ASSESSMENT E–J., Feb. 12, 
2008, at 5, http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2008-
3. 
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measuring the experience of corruption in Brazil have found 
the experience of corruption to be lower than the perception 
statistics would predict. For example, in response to extensive 
criticism of its CPI, Transparency International released a 
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) that includes a section 
asking respondents whether they had personally been expected 
to or paid a bribe to a government service provider in the past 
year. The 2010 GCB found that only 4% of Brazilians had paid 
a bribe, which is a lower percentage of bribe–givers than the 
survey found in the United States or any other country in Latin 
America.144 Other studies have used the United Nations’ 
Interregional Crime and Victimization Survey to generate 
transnational comparisons of the corruption experience,145 but 
these studies have only examined relatively old data for 
Brazil,146 and are therefore not included in this analysis.  
 
IV. THE MISUSE OF CORRUPTION STATISTICS BY 
AMERICAN LAWYERS MAGNIFIES THE COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE FCPA 
As noted above, Brazil is widely perceived to be highly 
corrupt, but other data sources give researchers reason to 
question the validity of that perception. In spite of the conflict 
between different measures, perception data is frequently 
discussed and disseminated as though it were a measure of 
corruption rather than corruption perception — producing 
confusion among many consumers of this information.147 
Recent scholarship has suggested that corruption perception 
data is systematically biased and is not a valid measure for 
actual corruption levels.148 This is troubling because many 
lawyers are among those who have disregarded the distinction 
between perception and reality, and are advising business 
clients to use the CPI to gauge comparative corruption risk 
between nations.149 This statistical problem implicates a larger 
literature critical of the FCPA’s effect on business — and 
suggests that the American approach to anti–corruption 
 
 144. See, e.g., Transparency Int’l, Global Corruption Barometer 2010/11, 
http://gcb.transparency.org/gcb201011/results/ (placing Brazil in the same 
category as countries that are perceived as having far lower levels of 
corruption such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada). 
 145. See, e.g., Donchev, supra note 118, at 8–10. 
 146. Id. at 21 tbl.1 (listing ICVS data from 1996, but not from 2000). 
 147. Abramo, supra note 143, at 3. 
 148. See infra Part IV.1. 
 149. See infra Part IV.2. 
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enforcement may lead some companies to avoid doing business 
in countries that are perceived to be more corrupt than other 
corruption metrics suggest.150  
 
1. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING MEASURES FOR 
CORRUPTION 
Recent research has given scholars good reason to question 
the construct validity of corruption perception data as a 
measure for actual corruption.151 Though replacing corruption 
perception with concrete experience–based measures would 
solve some of the more glaring problems with ranking 
corruption based on the aggregation of opinions, it is also not 
an entirely satisfactory measure for corruption. No existing 
measure for corruption is suitable for scaling country risk in 
the creation of anti–corruption compliance programs.  
Corruption perception data has been criticized as 
inconsistent with experiential data.152 Indeed, some authors 
assume that concrete experiences of corruption are a more 
reliable measure than surveys on how corrupt a group of 
American experts consider a country to be.153 These authors 
suggest that the low correlation between expert assessments 
and experiential data “might be taken as a sign that experts 
have a quite coherent set of beliefs about the incidence of 
corruption that bears little resemblance to realities on the 
ground.”154 Various reasons have been given to prefer 
experience based proxies over perception based proxies. Several 
of these criticisms are particularly persuasive with regards to 
Brazil and other similarly situated developing economies. First, 
corruption perception data has been criticized for reflecting a 
Western ideological bias among respondents — skewing 
perceptions of corruption upwards in countries that are 
 
 150. See infra Part IV.3. 
 151. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 3–5 (discussing generally the various 
criticisms of corruption perceptions data).   
 152. See generally Treisman, supra note 121, at 219. 
 153. See id. at 217.  
 154. Daniel Treisman does not endorse the conclusion that the 
inconsistency between perceptions and corruption, in itself, indicates that 
perceptions data is flawed since this would be subject to the same criticism 
legitimately made against those who over–rely on perceptions data; that one 
should not blindly assume a proxy is a valid measure for the real thing. See 
id.; see, e.g., Abramo, supra note 1143, at 3–4 (“[R]eporting instances of 
bribery provides a presumably objective assessment of the actual incidence of 
corruption among populations” without justifying the assumption that 
experiential statistics provide an unbiased measure of actual corruption). 
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culturally different from that of the respondents.155 This gives 
an especially strong reason to question the validity of 
perception data on Brazil, which is not generally perceived to 
be a part of the Western world.156 Second, research has found 
that perceptions of corruption are influenced by the total 
number of corruption episodes — causing larger countries to be 
perceived as more corrupt.157 Because of this, corruption 
perception data for Brazil is particularly likely to be inflated in 
relation to actual corruption as a percentage of total political 
and business activity.158 Third, cultural factors such as 
longstanding Protestant traditions, a history of democracy, and 
centralized government all distort the perception of corruption 
downward with relation to other corruption proxies.159 This 
also gives this researcher reason to believe that corruption 
perception data is particularly likely to be unreliable in 
measuring Brazil’s actual corruption in light of the country’s 
strong Catholic, native, and African religious history,160 recent 
transition to democracy,161 and federalist system.162 Finally, 
some respondents might have longstanding perceptions of a 
nation’s corruption that persist regardless of national changes, 
which is problematic in Brazil because of its recent transition 
from military rule to democracy.163  
Other difficulties presented by the use of corruption 
perception data include the problem of differing cultural 
perceptions, since different definitions and opinions of 
“corruption” between countries make perception scores between 
 
 155. See Treisman, supra note 121, at 211–15. 
 156. See DAVID J. HESS & ROBERTO DA MATTA, THE BRAZILIAN PUZZLE: 
CULTURE ON THE BORDERLANDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 2 (1995) (“Brazil is 
something else, something different from the United States, Canada, and the 
societies of Western Europe. It is a country where Western culture has mixed 
and mingled with non–Western cultures for centuries.”). 
 157. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 2. 
 158. Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business 
and Enriches Insiders, FORBES MAGAZINE, May 24, 2010, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-
bribery-racket.html. 
 159. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 2. 
 160. SHAWN BLORE & ALEXANDRA DE VRIES, FROMMER’S BRAZIL 20 (2010) 
(noting that the growing number of Protestants in Brazil is a recent 
phenomenon).  
 161. See generally THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE 
IN BRAZIL 1964–85 256–303 (1988).  
 162. DAVID SAMUELS, AMBITION, FEDERALISM, AND LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 
IN BRAZIL 79–110 (2003). 
 163. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 3–5.  
CAMPBELL - FCPA in Brazil (22 MINN J INTL L 247 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:52 PM 
270 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW   [Vol 22:1 
 
countries impossible to meaningfully compare.164 Historical and 
economic factors also influence the perception of corruption, 
meaning that corruption perceptions measure many factors 
totally unrelated to actual corruption.165 Furthermore, different 
levels of sensitivity to corruption among different cultural 
groups can result in statistical distortion that paradoxically 
makes populations that are more sensitive to and critical of 
corruption appear more corrupt.166 Superior anti–corruption 
enforcement might also, ironically, increase the perception of 
corruption by revealing plots that would not influence 
corruption perception if they remained secret.167 Also, the vast 
majority of respondents in perception surveys lack direct 
experience with corruption in the countries they are asked to 
compare, so their responses are often not supported by any 
substantial evidence but are instead purely “attitudinal.”168 
Cultural variance in the acceptability of criticizing 
governments may vary widely, further confounding attempts to 
treat corruption perception as an indicator of actual 
corruption.169  
As a result of these, and other serious methodological and 
theoretical problems with corruption perception data, many 
scholars, including a former researcher for Transparency 
International have admitted that the CPI needs to be radically 
revised to be a valid measure for comparative corruption.170 All 
this is not to say that corruption perception data is useless,171 
only that it is completely unsuited to transnational 
comparisons of actual corruption levels.172 These criticisms of 
 
 164. See Marcus J. Kurtz & Andrew Schrank, Growth and Governance: 
Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, 69 J. POL. 538, 543 (2007). 
 165. See id. 
 166. Donchev, supra note 118, at 8. 
 167. See id. at 2–10. 
 168. See id. at 4.  
 169. Id. at 8. 
 170. Fredrik Galtung, Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and 
Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices, in MEASURING CORRUPTION 101, 124 
(Charles Sampford et al. eds., 2006). 
 171. Treisman, supra note 121, at 220 (examining how there is still reason 
to study perceived corruption indexes even though they do not measure the 
actual frequency of corruption, because for some types of research perceptions 
are independently important). 
 172. Id. at 217–20 (noting that research disputing the construct validity of 
corruption perceptions as a measurement for corruption calls into question the 
use of perception data as a factor in the award of American development 
grants). 
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corruption perception data have not deterred the majority of 
international investors, development assistance programs, or 
academics from relying on the data in their attempts to 
evaluate the quality of governance in developing countries.173 
Some academics simply assume that “perceptions are 
commonly a good indicator of the real level of corruption,” as if 
they had compared perception statistics to some independent 
estimate of the “real level” of corruption.174 Politicians have 
suggested forming government policy, including the 
distribution of development aid, based on a preference for 
countries perceived to have low levels of corruption.175 As 
argued below, one of the worst offenders in the 
misinterpretation of corruption perception data is the legal 
profession.176  
Authors have devised various creative solutions to the 
problem of measuring the problem of corruption. One promising 
approach is to compare the expert–estimated cost of public 
engineering projects with the actual price tag.177 
Unfortunately, to date, this methodology has not been applied 
to Brazil, or indeed on any kind of scale that would allow it to 
be used to compare corruption levels between nations. Another 
interesting solution to the problem of measuring corruption has 
been to conduct surveys of the international businesspeople 
who actually give bribes.178 However, this data is probably 
biased by the self–interest of respondents,179 and has been 
limited to small geographic regions, limiting its value for cross–
national comparison.180 Another study compares countries to 
 
 173. CHRISTINE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN, USES AND ABUSES OF 
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS Ch. 3 (Org. for Economic Co–operation and Dev. 
Ctr. 2006). 
 174. Abramo, supra note 143, at 3–4. 
 175. Id. at 4 n.5. 
 176. See infra Part IV–2 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Miriam A. Golden & Lucio Picci, Proposal for a New Measure of 
Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data, 17 ECON. & POL. 37, 37 (2005) 
(“[Comparing] amounts of physically existing public infrastructures and the 
amounts of money cumulatively allocated by government to create these public 
works . . . [to identify where] money is being lost to fraud, embezzlement, 
waste, and mismanagement . . . .”). 
 178. See George R.G. Clarke & Lixin Colin Xu, Privatization, Competition, 
and Corruption: How Characteristics of Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribes 
to Utilities, 88 J. OF PUB. ECON. 2067, 2068 (2004) (combining firm–level data 
in twenty–one countries to define characteristics of enterprises that do and do 
not pay bribes and identify nation–based characteristics). 
 179. Kurtz, supra note 164, at 540–48. 
 180. Donchev, supra note 118, at 3. 
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determine where the greatest number of fines have been paid 
for violations of the FCPA.181 The authors who produce that 
data, though, seem to understand that they have not produced 
a measure of corruption because of biases that may influence 
the total number of FCPA fines in a given country.182 
Studies that replace the proxy of corruption perception 
with the proxy of corruption experience reduce problems 
related to Western bias and cultural differences Instead of 
asking about general perceptions of bribery it measures the 
frequency of a concrete event that is interpreted as an 
experience with government corruption. However, the 
weakness of this approach for anti–corruption compliance is 
that it equates petty bribery of police officers and bureaucrats 
to high–level corruption among government officials and 
businesspeople.183 Though it could be argued that every 
different manifestation of corruption experienced by members 
of each social strata are all generated by some central core set 
of cultural and institutional problems, this hypothesis has not 
yet been proved by any of the authors whose studies implicitly 
rely upon it.184 Therefore, no existing methodology for the 
measurement of corruption is completely satisfactory for the 
legal profession’s anti–corruption compliance needs.  
 
2. THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S MISUSE OF CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTION DATA  
It has been said that “most lawyers went to law school 
because they did not like math as a subject.”185 It is therefore 
unsurprising that some lawyers overlook the intricacies of the 
statistical debate over measuring corruption and instead 
endorse the use of perception data for FCPA compliance 
purposes. The popularity of corruption perception data in the 
 
 181. Where the Bribes Are: Penalties in U.S. Government FCPA Cases Since 
1977, JAMES MINTZ GROUP, http://fcpamap.com/ (last viewed Oct. 2, 2012). 
 182. Joe Palazzolo, Where the Bribes Are, WSJ LAW BLOG (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/16/where-the-bribes-are/ (quoting Jim Mintz, 
founder and president of the organization that created the map of FCPA 
enforcement, saying the purpose of the map was to  create “a stark way of 
showing the risks of bribery”). 
 183. Donchev, supra note 118, at 12. 
 184. See, e.g., id. 
 185. Paul J. Lesti, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS § 9:20 (2d ed. 2009); see also 
Elie Mystal, Non-Sequiturs:  05.22.12, ABOVE THE LAW (May 22, 2012), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2012/05/non-sequiturs-05-22-12/ (“[I]f these judges and 
attorneys were good at math, they wouldn’t have gone to law school in the first 
place.”). 
CAMPBELL - FCPA in Brazil (22 MINN J INTL L 247 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:52 PM 
2013] FCPA IN BRAZIL 273 
 
legal community is exemplified by a recent Council of Foreign 
Relations corporate program meeting where one international 
law partner felt the need to give a “shout–out” to Transparency 
International for creating the CPI.186 Lawyers advise 
businesses subject to the FCPA to consult corruption perception 
data without warning them about the distinction between 
corruption perception and actual corruption or otherwise 
discussing the limitations of the data.187 One international 
lawyer and former U.S. Attorney said “Transparency 
International’s report is useful in evaluating the playing field 
around the world in terms of ethical business practices.”188 A 
recent article went so far as to claim that “TI and other web–
based reports by groups and law firms focusing on the FCPA 
also assist firms in gauging the extent of the risk of corruption 
 
 186. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, 
Dep’t of Justice, International Criminal Law Enforcement: Rule of Law, Anti-
Corruption, and Beyond, Address at Council on Foreign Relations Corporate 
Program Meeting (May 4, 2010), transcript available at 
http://www.cfr.org/international-law/international-criminal-law-enforcement-
rule-law-anti-corruption-beyond/p22048. 
 187. See, e.g., Santiago A. Cueto, 2009 Corruption Perception Index 
Released: Can You Guess Where The U.S. Ranked?, INT’L BUS. L. ADVISOR 
(Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://www.internationalbusinesslawadvisor.com/2009/11/articles/corporate-
governance-2/2009-corruption-perception-index-released-can-you-guess-where-
the-us-ranked/; R. CHRISTOPHER COOK & STEPHANIE CONNOR, JONES DAY, 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ENFORCEMENT TRENDS IN 2010 AND 
BEYOND (2010), available at 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/f0950ee5-18bb-496f-acfe-
662b219a108e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ada2352f-00b0-4240-aeef-
250a23629ba8/FCPA%20Enforcement%20Trends.pdf (including a table of CPI 
data in a publication on avoiding FCPA liability without discussion of the 
data’s limitations); Christopher T. Marquet, Avoiding the Pitfalls of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, MARQUET INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.marquetinternational.com/pdf/avoiding_the_pitfalls_of_the_fcpa.p
df (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (noting that while Mr. Marquet is not himself a 
lawyer he is included in this list because he provides due diligence and 
litigation support services and is a non–lawyer member of the Massachusetts 
Bar Association). But see GIBSON DUNN, DO RANKINGS MATTER? 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ITS 2010 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS 
INDEX (Nov. 16, 2010) (acknowledging the possibly misleading nature of 
corruption perceptions scores but underscoring the fact that in spite of the 
problems with the data the CPI is still the most commonly used measure of 
corruption and that businesses compliance evaluators calculate risk 
assessments using the CPI). 
 188. Interview by Global Atlanta with Greenberg Traurig, Former U.S. 
Attorney, Global Atlanta (August 19, 2010), 
http://www.gtlaw.com/NewsEvents/MediaCoverage?find=138561. 
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problems they will encounter doing business abroad.”189 Even 
scholars who still favor the limited use of corruption perception 
data agree that corruption perception data cannot form a valid 
basis for a transnational comparison of actual corruption and 
that attempting to do so is a serious misuse of the resource.190 
The endemic misuse of corruption perception data in the legal 
community underscores the legal profession’s need for a better 
tool for evaluating and comparing country corruption 
compliance risk. At a minimum, lawyers must understand and 
explain the limitations of existing corruption data before 
advising clients to use it for FCPA compliance purposes.  
 
3. THE FCPA AS AN “ECONOMIC SANCTION” ON DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTION DATA  
A business leader, discussing anti–corruption regulations, 
stated that, “It’s very, very difficult to distinguish between the 
potential for corruption (or corruption risk) and actual 
corruption.”191 This comment is suggestive of this article’s 
thesis: It is hard for business leaders to measure actual 
corruption, so their adversity to potentially massive FCPA 
liability risk induces them to avoid business in countries that 
are seen as corrupt.192 American businesspeople in corrupt 
markets are forced to either violate the FCPA and face 
potential prosecution or behave ethically and lose business to 
Chinese or Russian competitors whose governments do not 
punish companies for acts of overseas bribery.193 University of 
Chicago–Kent College of Law Professor Andrew Spalding 
argues that the FCPA deters American companies from 
investing in developing countries, making it essentially 
function as an economic sanction.194 This note builds on 
 
 189. Cherie O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, 17 
INT’L TRADE L.J. 3, 3 (2008). 
 190. Arndt, supra note 173, at ch. 3. 
 191. DOW JONES RISK & COMPLIANCE, DOW JONES STATE OF ANTI–
CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE SURVEY 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.dowjones.com/pressroom/SMPRs/DowJonesStateofCorruptionSurv
ey_000.swf. 
 192. Vardi, supra note 158. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See generally, Spalding, supra note 22 (noting that the FCPA deters 
desirable investment from countries like the United States in countries where 
bribery is perceived to be common). 
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Spaulding’s work;195 it finds that the distinction between 
corruption perception and reality shows that businesses are not 
only deterred from investing in countries that are actually 
corrupt —they are also deterred from countries that are merely 
perceived to be corrupt. Such analysis supports the addition of 
a compliance defense to the FCPA. If the FCPA is indeed to be 
understood as an economic sanction, it must be seen as a 
particularly irrational sanction because it punishes countries 
for simply being perceived as corrupt while reducing 
investment in countries that would otherwise be promising 
markets for American businesses. This analysis also implies 
that Transparency International and legal professionals that 
use their data need to do a better job of clarifying the 
limitations of the data and encourage the development of new 
corruption measures.  
Spaulding traces the roots of his theory to a statistical 
analysis performed about twenty years after the passage of the 
FCPA. This analysis found that when the FCPA took effect, 
United States business in countries believed to be corrupt 
showed “unusual declines,” and that post–FCPA American 
investment grew more rapidly in countries believed to be less 
corrupt.196 This study also found that there was no general drop 
in international business in these  countries believed to be 
corrupt, suggesting that when American companies pulled back 
because of FCPA fears, they were replaced by “black knights” 
— firms from countries that do not punish their own companies 
for acts of overseas bribery.197 Spaulding also argues that more 
recent empirical work has confirmed the thesis that 
anticorruption legislation deters businesses from investing in 
countries perceived to be corrupt.198 This statistical observation 
has been explained by the fact that some companies see bribery 
 
 195. Unlike the legal professionals criticized above for treating the CPI like 
a tool that can be used to compare actual corruption, Spaulding always 
carefully referred to “perceived corruption” in his work – but he never explored 
the potential implications of this distinction for his research. See generally, id. 
 196. Id. at 372 (citing James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign 
Bribery and American Business After 1977 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf). 
 197. Id. at 372, 392 (citing James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: 
Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf). 
 198. Id. at 371–72 (citing Alvaro Cuervo–Cazurra, Who Cares About 
Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 807, 814 (2006)). 
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as the cost of doing business in environments that they 
perceive to be corrupt, and believe that it may be hard to design 
an FCPA compliance program that can guarantee that no 
company agents will engage in unapproved acts of 
corruption.199 Spaulding suggests that because developing 
markets are generally perceived to be more corrupt than 
developed ones, the FCPA deters foreign investors from 
infusing these economies with needed capital investments.200  
Recent surveys of business leaders support the statistical 
analysis cited by Spaulding. A survey of 214 executives whose 
companies are subject to anti–corruption legislation found that 
32% of United Kingdom respondents and 25% of United States 
respondents acknowledge that not doing business in corrupt 
countries is a way of avoiding the risk for liability in these 
areas of the world.201 The 2011 Dow Jones State of Anti–
Corruption Compliance Survey, which surveyed more than 300 
companies worldwide, found that more than 55% of companies 
delay or avoid working with global business partners due to the 
fear of liability of corruption in foreign markets.202  
The difference between perception and experience based 
corruption data above suggests the FCPA may function not 
only as a sanction on actually corrupt countries but also on 
countries that are merely perceived to be corrupt. Brazil is 
perceived to be far more corrupt than experience based 
measures suggest. The existence of countries with mixed 
corruption indicators demonstrates that at times, the 
distinction between perception and reality may lead some 
business leaders to avoid investing because they believe the 
FCPA enforcement risk in a given nation to be higher than it 
really is. This gives further support to Spaulding’s criticism of 
the FCPA because it indicates that if the FCPA should be 
viewed as an economic sanction, it needs to be understood as a 
poorly aimed sanction that punishes countries based only on 
their reputation for corruption instead of any concrete evidence.  
The sanction effect hypothesized in this article has 
 
 199. Gregory M. Lipper, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Elusive 
Question of Intent, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1463, 1479 (2010). 
 200. See, e.g., Spalding, supra note 22, at 373–74. 
 201. Press Release, KPMG, Majority of U.S. and U.K. Executives Say 
Corruption Still Hampers Ability To Expand, Do Business In Some Countries, 
(April 7, 2011) available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/be/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/press-
releases/pages/04072011-e.aspx. 
 202. See COOK, supra note 187, at 2. 
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interesting policy implications for Brazilian lawmakers. As 
previously noted, “black knights” like China and Russia are 
generally thought to fill any gaps left by American businesses 
that are too risk–averse to invest in countries perceived to be 
corrupt.203 Some Brazilian policymakers might consider it 
tempting to let Chinese investors fill the gap left by American 
businesses too afraid of FCPA liability to invest in Brazil, but 
the undervalued Yuan, a growing trade deficit, and competition 
for the manufactured goods market in Latin America, among 
other economic issues indicate that if Brazil over–relies on 
Chinese investment that it will do so to its own detriment.204 As 
a result, Brazilian policymakers should consider the reduction 
of the appearance of corruption to be critical in order to 
promote economic growth. In Luis Eduardo Suarez’s fictional 
but verisimilar book about police in Rio de Janeiro, Elite da 
Tropa,205 the Secretary of Public Safety tells a journalist who is 
about to publish a story about police corruption: “[T]hat’s life. 
Especially public life. It’s not enough to be honest, my friend, 
you have to appear honest as well.”206 Brazilian policymakers 
should take the fictional Secretary’s words to heart, and pass 
tough anti–corruption laws in an attempt to re–adjust 
international corruption risk perceptions. Advanced legal 
systems with relatively low levels of perceived corruption 
consider the reduction of the appearance of corruption to be an 
important policy goal.207 This research suggests that Brazilian 
policymakers should do more to reduce the appearance of 
corruption to supplement their existing fight against actual 
corruption. 
The sanction hypothesis advanced in this article has the 
 
 203. See Spalding, supra note 22, at 397. 
 204. CARLOS PEREIRA & JOÃO AUGUSTO DE CASTRO NEVES, FOREIGN 
POLICY AT BROOKINGS, POLICY PAPER NO. 26, BRAZIL AND CHINA: SOUTH–
SOUTH PARTNERSHIP OR NORTH–SOUTH COMPETITION? 3–7 (March 2011), 
available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/4/03%20brazil%2
0china%20pereira/03_brazil_china_pereira.pdf. 
 205. Peter Sciretta, ‘Elite Squad 2’ is a Must See Crime Thriller [Sundance 
Review], SLASH FILM, (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.slashfilm.com/elite-squad-2-
sundance-review/ (describing Elite Squad: The Enemy Within, as “a cross 
between The Departed, The Wire, and The Godfather.”). 
 206. LUIZ EDUARDO SOARES ET AL., ELITE SQUAD 289 (Clifford E. Landers 
trans., 2008). 
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greatest implications for lawmakers in the United States, given 
the growing importance that countries like Brazil have to the 
world economy. Brazilians have long repeated the mantra that 
Brazil is the country of the future, because its vast territory,208 
large population,209 and an ample supply of natural resources210 
give it a staggering economic potential. In recent years it has 
become cliché for commentators discussing Brazil to claim that 
the future has arrived.211 Even in the context of the country’s 
relatively slow growth in 2012,212 these claims do not seem out 
of place given Brazil’s recent advances,213 discovery of massive 
offshore oil fields,214 and the revenues expected when Brazil 
hosts the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 
2016.215 Though some commentators have urged restraint in 
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13, 2008, at A1, available at 
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the evaluation of emerging markets such as Brazil,216 even 
cautious and skeptical analysis suggest a positive outlook for 
Brazil’s economy.217 Furthermore, the Goldman Sachs report 
cited above indicates that the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China) are considered to have sufficient growth 
potential to overtake more mature economies in the coming 
decades.218 The Goldman analysts argue that new economic 
realities are being created by the rise of the BRICs and that 
governments and firms in the developed world ought to take 
note and invest accordingly.219 According to this note, the 
FCPA actually creates fear of investing in these developing 
countries. This is particularly harmful to the United States 
because it denies important investment opportunities for 
American businesses. If, as the Goldman report suggests, 
American investors need to pursue opportunities in the BRICs 
— then American government policy should reflect that need 
by eliminating artificial barriers between its businesses and 
best new prospects for increased profits. While American 
business is certainly seeing growth in Brazil, my research may 
suggest that existing investment levels are lower than they 
would be without the unnecessary fear induced by FCPA 
concerns.  
Ultimately, this refinement of the sanction thesis bolsters 
suggestions that the FCPA should be amended to contain an 
affirmative defense for companies that make a good–faith 
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attempt to comply with the law. A compliance based 
affirmative defense does not completely eliminate the market 
distortion created by anti–corruption legislation because 
companies doing business in countries believed to be corrupt 
still need to invest more money into compliance programs than 
businesses in developed nations.220 However, the cost of an 
anti–corruption compliance program is far lower than the harm 
sustained by an FCPA enforcement action.221 Even if a 
compliance defense would not completely solve the sanction 
problem, it would at least minimize the market distortion 
created by a law that is meant to deter bribery but in its 
present form actually deters investment. A compliance defense 
does not solve the sanction problem, but it certainly 
ameliorates the issue for developing countries that are 
perceived to be corrupt.  
This research also has important implications for 
transnational NGOs, such as Transparency International, 
which should do a better job explaining the limitations of 
perception–based data and highlight some alternative 
corruption measures to encourage further research. This note 
suggests that, at a minimum, American lawyers need to stop 
advising clients to calibrate anti–corruption compliance 
programs based on perception data and communicate more of 
the limitations of perception data to clients engaging in FCPA 
compliance risk calculations.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The last few years were the first time in history that a 
country meaningfully threatened its own businesspeople with 
criminal liability for overseas bribery. The United States was 
the first major power to take such a step, and the legislation it 
produced was historic but flawed. The absence of an affirmative 
defense for compliance and the impossibility of implementing a 
perfectly effective anti–corruption program have made it very 
important for companies to accurately predict which regions, 
countries, or industries will create the greatest temptations for 
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their agents to engage in bribery. Unfortunately it is impossible 
to accurately measure corruption itself, and the most popular 
proxy to date is the aggregation of a number of surveys of 
opinions. The aggregation of opinion is still nothing more than 
opinion — and in this case there is little observed 
correspondence between perception and reality. In spite of 
these flaws some members of the legal profession have 
wholeheartedly endorsed the use of perception data for anti–
corruption compliance, which is problematic since existing data 
suggests that some companies completely avoid countries that 
they perceive to be an anti–corruption compliance risk.  
Non–perception based data suggests that Brazil may be a 
country where there is a particularly wide disjuncture between 
perception and reality on the issue of corruption. Essentially, 
this means that Brazil might be the innocent bystander struck 
by the crossfire between the United States and foreign 
corruption. However, it also means that the United States 
could be hurting itself because it is creating a disincentive for 
its own businesses to invest in highly promising markets. The 
addition of a compliance defense to the FCPA is desirable, since 
it would alleviate both problems. Until American lawmakers 
follow the British lead and make good–faith attempts to comply 
with the law an affirmative defense to FCPA charges, the legal 
profession needs to do a better job of explaining the limits of 
statistical measures of corruption to clients calibrating their 
global compliance programs.  
